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Corruption in India 
 Andrew Sanchez 
The momentum of last year’s hunger strike by the anti-corruption campaigner Kisan ‘Anna’ Hazare currently sees India’s parliament wrestling with the formation of 
a national corruption ombudsman. Hazare’s campaign rests upon the proposition that 
the democratic ideals with which the Indian state was formed in 1947 are all too often 
subverted by the self-interest of public servants. Hazare’s supporters argue that this process 
has two primary effects. First, corruption allows wealthier citizens to access resources 
and preferential state treatment to which they are not entitled. Second, corruption 
constitutes a drain on the coffers of many ordinary Indians, in the form of demands for 
bribes by state functionaries, without which their services cannot necessarily be procured.
Hazare’s formulation is largely correct, and if popular support for his campaign is any indication, he has 
articulated a political frustration with bribery that is unique in spanning the regional, ethnic and religious 
divisions of Indian society. However, the discontent which Hazare’s movement expresses relates to a 
corruption that is broader than bribery alone. ‘Corruption’ in this context encompasses a more pernicious 
subversion of the Indian state that has seen substantial numbers of often violent career criminals enter 
parliament since the 1970s, and has consequently weakened popular faith in governmental institutions. 
The current relationship between politics and criminality is a consequence of a culture of entrepreneurial 
corruption that adheres to Indian public offi ce. While parliamentary service remains such a lucrative 
profession, it will continue to attract individuals whose ambitions extend beyond the confi nes of their 
position, and whose means of satisfying them include coercion. 
The extent to which Hazare will fi nd satisfaction in India’s corruption ombudsman depends in the fi rst 
instance on whether the ‘Lokpal’ (‘protector of the people’) bill to which it relates is ever enacted; the 
bill is currently stalled in the upper house of the Indian parliament and may never be fully realised. 
However, should the bill be passed, it is unlikely that the scrutiny of an ombudsman alone can provide 
the framework necessary to combat corruption at the higher reaches of the Indian state. The task 
requires a substantial overhaul of the wider legislation that currently protects the most powerful public 
servants who abuse their positions, and a real engagement with the infl uence of violence and organised 
crime on national politics.
Anti-corruption watchdog Transparency International currently ranks the national perception of corruption 
in India to be 87th highest in the world (in an index of 182 positions). While many nations fare better 
than India in this ranking, many evidently fare much worse, including regional neighbours Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. However, the real signifi cance of perceptions of corruption does not lie in the extent to which 
phenomena such as bribery are perceived to be prevalent across society. A more important assessment 
is of how differing forms of corruption are deemed to be concentrated at different levels of the state, 
and whether such practices are seen as integral to the consolidation of power. In India, public scandals 
of the previous twenty years, which link numerous elected politicians and even government ministers to 
repeated acts of parliamentary corruption, embezzlement, land seizure, blackmail, extortion, kidnap and 
murder, serve to erode the assumption of legitimate political authority and the effi cacy of the ballot box. 
While bribery in its many forms undoubtedly impedes the proper functioning of institutions, the 
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preponderance of criminal politicians corrupts the 
very notion of the accountable and democratic state 
on which the idea of India rests.
The popular perception of Indian political criminality is 
well substantiated by the available data. In the current 
Indian parliament, of the 543 elected representatives 
of the lower house, 158 (29 percent) are currently 
charged with a criminal offence. More shockingly still, 
seventy four (14 percent) are charged with crimes in 
the most serious category of offence, comprised of 
murder, rape, extortion, banditry and theft. While it 
is problematic to draw a simple relationship between 
criminal charges and actual guilt, it is apparent that 
politicians fall foul of the law far more frequently than 
almost any other section of Indian society, posing 
the pertinent question of why particular types of 
people are so often attracted to a political career. 
Alternatively, though less plausibly, one could ask why 
it is that politicians are so disproportionately targeted 
for spurious criminal investigations. 
The distribution of criminal charges within the Indian 
parliament is weighted towards MPs representing 
the smaller parties, whose support bases rely upon 
the politics of caste and ethno-regionalism. Among 
the two major parties, the Congress Party, whose 
ideology is a secular state-socialism, has 5 percent 
of its 205 MPs currently facing charges, while the 
Bharatiya Janata Party, representing a broad platform 
of Hindu nationalism, sees 16 percent of its 116 
MPs charged. At the other end of the spectrum, the 
regional Samajwadi and Bahujan Samaj parties, who 
predominantly represent the interests of untouchable 
castes, have 60 percent of their MPs currently charged. 
Other ethno-regional parties fare similarly poorly. 
Interrogating this phenomenon better substantiates 
the contexts in which criminals are likely to enter 
Indian politics.
Many of the Indian political parties strongly associated 
with criminality have their support bases in a vast 
northern swath of the country, running from the 
state of Haryana in the centre west, across Uttar 
Pradesh to the eastern states of Bihar and Jharkhand. 
Obscuring the understanding of political criminality 
in these states is a popular national perception 
of this region as a violent, culturally conservative 
backwater, plagued by poverty and communalism. 
That some of the politicians who represent these 
states should be criminal despots is often said to 
express the particular troubles and cultural dispositions 
of the region. In reality, the emergence of political 
criminality in this part of India relates to the use of 
political violence by the central government from the 
1970s, and the present relationship between provincial 
criminal politicians and their ostensibly more legitimate 
counterparts is closer than one would suspect. 
In explaining the rise of India’s criminal politicians, 
one might consider the possibility that a new type of 
charismatic political leader emerged during the 1970s 
that broke with the ‘statesman’ model of the Congress 
Party, and was valued for their willingness to dirty 
their hands on behalf of their constituents. Certainly, 
a profound change overtook political leadership during 
this period, as violence began to be valued more highly 
by certain sections of the electorate, particularly within 
ethno-regional movements. However, the widespread 
incorporation of criminals into Indian politics stems 
initially from the use of coercion during Indira Gandhi’s 
‘State of Emergency’ from June 1975 to March 1977. 
During this period, the Congress Party embarked upon 
a dictatorship, ostensibly to secure national unity in 
the midst of parliamentary turmoil. 
The ‘emergency’ saw many civil liberties suspended 
and political dissent silenced through widespread 
arrest and coercion, a signifi cant proportion of which 
was conducted by criminal enforcers at the behest of 
the state. The Congress Party’s use of violence made 
criminal enforcers an integral element of political 
control in many areas of the nation; enforcers who 
then subsequently used state connections and 
increased economic power to consolidate their own 
positions. Dire ethical failings aside, the practical fl aw 
of the Congress’ use of violence lay in their failure to 
anticipate that the criminals which they courted would 
remain part of the political landscape long after their 
immediate usefulness had been exhausted. The most 
successful of these criminals amassed suffi cient power 
and infl uence to enter parliament themselves, where 
the status of their offi ce could further their enterprises. 
The present concentration of India’s criminal politicians 
in quite particular areas of the nation can be 
explained with reference to the political economies 
of the regions concerned. 
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Across Haryana, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, post-
independence rural relations have been characterised 
by a progressively open state of confl ict between 
lower-caste tenants and their upper-caste landlords. 
In this climate, the use of politically orchestrated 
violence is increasingly salient, and charismatic criminal 
leadership is more likely to fl ourish. In Bihar, criminal 
authority was further entrenched by 1975’s state-
wide alcohol prohibition, which created a lucrative 
market for bootlegged liquor. Regional criminal 
organisations prospered in the 1970s by providing 
coercive political services and fulfi lling black market 
demands for consumer goods. These organisations 
eventually diversifi ed into labour contracting, haulage, 
mineral extraction, metal trading and waste disposal 
as the region’s industrial sectors expanded throughout 
the 1980s. During the 1990s, the power of regional 
criminal politicians received a further boost from the 
centre, as a series of weak coalition governments 
allowed the smaller parties on which they were 
dependent to wield a disproportionate level of power 
in parliamentary votes. It is during this period that the 
Congress Party became embroiled in the ‘bribes for 
votes’ scandal, which saw Prime Minster Narashima 
Rao convicted of corruption, and Sibu Soren, the 
head of the ethno-regional Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 
Party, convicted for the directly related murder of an 
alleged blackmailer.
It is not coincidental that the areas of the nation 
in which political authority currently enjoys the 
least confidence (namely Bihar, Jharkhand and 
Uttar Pradesh) are also those regions which afford 
political entrepreneurs some of the greatest economic 
opportunities through land seizures, industrial 
contracting, racketeering and labour brokerage. The 
penetration of known criminals into parliament has 
its clearest origins in the emergency’s use of applied 
violence. One might also conclude that the class and 
ethnic confl icts of particular regions explains why 
violence initially became a feature of charismatic 
leadership in Indian politics. However, it is the 
capacity of parliament to enable the consolidation 
of personal power that presently explains the allure 
of a political career to criminals, as well as the Indian 
electorate’s increasingly strident denunciation of 
such forms of authority. 
 The challenge presently facing the Indian state is to 
restore public confi dence in the morality and capacity 
of the nation’s politicians, by ensuring that criminals 
fi nd it harder to gain entry to a potentially lucrative 
parliamentary career. Meeting this challenge requires 
an as yet absent governmental will to reform the 
legislation that enables those charged with serious 
offences to stand for offi ce, and to avoid future 
criminal investigation once elected. The current 
governmental response to Hazare’s campaign seems 
encouraging, and is at the very least testament to 
the power of a well-informed citizenry to press its 
demands upon the state. However, one must doubt 
the depth and perhaps the sincerity with which the 
Indian parliament presently searches its collective 
soul. Neither the issues raised by Hazare or their 
proposed remedies are new. On the contrary, the 
corruption and criminalisation of politics has been 
the subject of numerous governmental commissions 
since the 1960s, most of which have reached the same 
conclusions as Hazare, and have vainly made almost 
identical suggestions for reform to those presently 
under discussion. 
For example, the fi rst Indian Committee on the 
Prevention of Corruption reported its fi ndings as 
early as March 1964, having been convened to 
investigate a perceived rise in ministerial corruption 
since independence. The committee concluded that 
India’s legislative framework was ill equipped to deal 
with political corruption, and outlined a procedure 
whereby complaints against members of parliament 
could be investigated by an independent committee, 
prior to police referral. If the 1964 committee’s 
suggestions seem well suited to the current political 
climate, it is because they were never acted upon 
and the legislative failings which they identifi ed have 
remained largely unaddressed for the previous four 
decades. Likewise, the ‘Lokpal’ bill, currently so fi ercely 
debated, has a long and faltering ancestry in Indian 
politics. Between 1969 and 1998, six separate Lokpal 
bills have been passed in India, only to lapse with the 
dissolution of parliament. 
What the historical farce of the Lokpal bills suggests 
is that the consistency with which independent 
enquiries diagnose and prescribe against political 
corruption in India, is matched only by the uniformity 
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with which their activities are ignored or obfuscated 
by the parliament. The fate of proposals directed 
more specifi cally at fl agrantly criminal acts of political 
corruption is worse still. Most recently, the 2010 
background paper on electoral reforms prepared by 
the Indian Election Commission has revisited two un-
heeded recommendations with which to combat the 
criminalisation of Indian politics, both of which were 
fi rst proposed in 2004. The Commission advises that 
prospective candidates for the lower house of the 
Indian parliament be required to declare all previous 
convictions, pending criminal cases and assets prior to 
standing, and suggests that the withholding of such 
information should be made punishable by a minimum 
of two years imprisonment. Moreover, the commission 
recommends disqualifi cation for all candidates against 
whom charges have been brought at least six months 
prior to election for the most serious category of 
offences. While a number of the Committee’s wider 
recommendations (regarding restrictions on the 
publication of exit poll results and the closer scrutiny 
of deposit monies) have been enacted, the bulk of 
suggestions that would curtail the entry of criminals 
into parliament have yet to fi nd favour. 
The will to restrict the entry of criminals into politics 
has to date not been present in any Indian government, 
and it is sensible to question the likely effectiveness 
of a corruption ombudsman whose architects are 
a parliament composed of such a high number 
of suspected criminals. Furthermore, the tenacity 
and success with which the prosecution of political 
corruption will be able to proceed in the future requires 
the redress of a number of substantial legislative 
failings. These include inadequate provisions for 
commissions of inquiry, courts and investigative bodies 
such as the Central Bureau of Investigation that are 
open to nepotistic appointments, and a legislative 
position of public offi cials that places them beyond 
the scope of some forms of legal scrutiny.
Whether the Lokpal bill will be passed, and its 
associated ombudsman proven effective remains to 
be seen. The bill’s critics argue quite reasonably that 
the omniscient scrutiny of a central ombudsman 
potentially trades one form of despotism for another, 
and it is prudent to ask whether the commission 
can itself remain immune from corruption, even 
if the institution were theoretically powerful. 
Certainly, many of the proposals in Hazare’s original 
bill have been considerably diluted in the version 
presented before parliament and the composition of 
the ombudsman will be a matter of intense scrutiny in 
coming months. As admirable as Hazare’s campaign 
has been, the wider struggle against state corruption 
in India is unlikely to be fulfi lled by the Lokpal alone. 
In addition to the Election Commission’s suggestions 
to broaden the disqualifi cation of criminal electoral 
candidates, at least three major reforms are necessary 
to forestall India’s further slide into institutional 
criminality. First, the state needs to address the 
substantial legislative failings surrounding the pursuit 
of judicial and political corruption, which presently 
grant public offi cials inexplicable immunity from 
prosecution in a bewildering array of contexts. In 
short, powerful public offi cials must be not only liable 
to public scrutiny, but also subject to the same forms 
and extent of punishment as the citizenry. Second, the 
state must endeavour to create a more transparent 
culture of business, through a rigorous and systematic 
enquiry into the context and fi nancing of corporate 
mergers, the sale and development of land, and the 
securing of contracts for the supply of labour, goods 
and services. The chief avenues by which corrupt 
politicians presently fi nd their business profi table 
must be subject to far greater attention. Third, the 
effectiveness of violent coercion by political authorities 
must be curbed by strengthening and rehabilitating 
India’s law enforcement agencies, which presently 
suffer from their own crisis of public confi dence 
owing to perceptions of corruption and institutional 
incompetence. If wielded by the state at all, the use of 
violence must be the preserve of an accountable and 
publicly trusted judiciary and not of political autocrats. 
The lack of faith in state institutions, and the popular 
suspicion that power is frequently derived from 
criminality, invites a critical reading of India’s rise to 
superpower status. The global authority which the 
nation is likely to wield in coming years is only to be 
lauded if power and prosperity is distributed more 
evenly within India itself: a challenge which requires 
a serious engagement with the problems of state 
corruption.  Whilst the task facing the Indian state is 
indeed substantial, the recent popular outcry shows 
that the country is rich in the popular will to enact 
such reforms. ■  
